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Discussions about Latin American philosophy in general, but in particular discussions 
about any of the philosophies of the region—Mexican philosophy, for example—tend 
to get entangled between two false oppositions, and the first one is as characteristic 
and popular as it is destructive. I will begin by trying to dissolve both of them, in 
order to introduce towards the end of this reflection a genuine opposition that is, I 
believe, of greater value. 
 
1. 
 
In order to present the first false opposition, which I consider as important as 
dangerous, I appeal to the strategy of detours. As a starting point, I’d like to answer 
the question: “why study Mexican philosophy?” Not infrequently, it is useful to place 
a question in a context, among other reasons, to determine it with some precision: in 
order to discover what is of interest when formulating such a question. For this 
reason, on this occasion I formulate the above question as follows: “Why should it 
matter to study Latin American philosophy and, specifically, Mexican philosophy, for 
example, in the United States?” The short answer is: to study Mexican philosophy— 
__________________________ 
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or, if you prefer, more comprehensively, Latin American philosophy—is a way to 
expand the tradition and, thus, to enrich it: with new voices and problems, perhaps 
even with other theories, methodologies, and arguments. When this short answer is 
given, doubts immediately arise: why should these voices, problems, and arguments 
be considered? This question leads me to offer a halfway response. Why halfway? As 
it often happens with some problems usually described as philosophical—the 
reference of language and rigid designators, practical and epistemic virtues and vices, 
freedom...—any answers proposed to these problems can in turn become starting 
points for other discussions that need long, very long answers. As we have to start 
somewhere, for the time being I will concentrate on producing a halfway response to 
the question that concerns us. 
 Regarding the short answer, it may be doubted why it should be interesting, for 
the analytical or the “continental” philosopher, or any other philosopher practicing in 
a philosophy department in the United States, to introduce in its canon or, if it is 
preferred, in its tradition, voices, problems, methodologies of Mexican philosophy. 
Predictably, answering this question depends on what is meant by Mexican 
philosophy. In Orosco 2016, José-Antonio Orosco1 presents a map of various ways of 
understanding—and, perhaps, also of misunderstanding—that philosophy. In what 
follows I shall reorganize that map a little. 
 The first way to understand it is as an abstract universalism. According to this 
position, there is nothing distinctive that should be referenced with expressions such 
as “Mexican philosophy” or “Latin American philosophy”. Philosophy is a field of 
research such as mathematics or natural science. The truths of philosophy are only 
universal. 
 A second way is cultural particularism. Under this denomination I subsume what 
Orosco calls “culturalism”, i.e. an understanding of philosophy as articulating a 
conception of the world and its culture, or some of its fragments, just the way Samuel 
Ramos, Leopoldo Zea or Jorge Portilla2 are assumed to have done about Mexican 
philosophy. I also include as a variant of this position Jorge Gracia’s proposal to 
understand Latin American philosophy as “ethnic philosophy”. For the philosophy of 
an ethnos—or, what is perhaps something similar, of a tradition, Gracia historicizes 
the Wittgensteinian metaphor of the family: an “ethnos” (or tradition?) is an extended 
human group that has unity or, at least, “family resemblances”, given by certain 
historical contingencies, without implying that all the members of the group share the 
same properties.3 
                                                
1 The title of Orosco 2016 (“The Philosophical Gift of Brown Folks: Mexican American Philosophy in 
the United States”) is a suggestive—and inspiring—variation of the book title of W.E.B. Du Bois, The 
Gift of Black Folks of 1924. In that book, Du Bois set out to exalt the contributions of the African-
American community to the cultural, political and economic life of the United States. 
2  Ramos 1972; Zea 2004; Sánchez 2012. 
3 As an introduction to the ideas of Gracia the reader may want to turn to, among other works, his 
Gracia 2010. Jaksic 2015 explores further and discusses these aspects in Gracia’s philosophical work. I 
think it’s fair to bring up here a remark from a review of this volume. Rivera Berruz 2016 rightly 
points out that: “There is no doubt that Gracia’s contributions to Philosophy have been major and 
influential, and this book is a true testament to that fact” (28). 
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  Orosco also indicates another way of understanding Latin American philosophy 
that he calls “criticalism”. As an example of “criticalism” Orosco recalls statements 
by Augusto Salazar Bondy, who points out that, since Latin America has lived under 
a “culture of domination”, it has not had the possibility of developing an authentic 
philosophy; but it could do so, given different economic and political circumstances.4 
I do not consider that this is a specific way of doing Latin American philosophy—or, 
for example, Mexican philosophy. Critical thinking is one of the many constitutive 
duties of any philosophy insofar as it has been, and is, and I suppose it will continue 
to be, a philosophy—that is, if it does not want to betray itself.5 
  Consequently, two positions remain on the map that corner us into a discouraging 
alternative. It is the first false opposition that I am interested in dissolving. For if an 
abstract universalism is accepted in the existing departments of philosophy, it will 
surely be pointed out that the canon is already overcrowded. If, by chance, an 
unexpected figure or unexpected problem appears in Mexican philosophy that until 
now nobody had taken into account, it will be considered and introduced in the 
discussion; however, to give it such a consideration it is not necessary to prescribe 
students a course on “Latin American philosophy” or “Mexican philosophy”. This is 
an elegant response, but it is deeply arrogant to those who have an interest in teaching 
(or taking) such courses: it’s a way to say “Do not bother”. If, on the other hand, a 
cultural particularism is accepted, the reaction will be equivalent. It will be observed 
that some neopositivists already stated that conceptions of the world are one thing and 
philosophy is quite another. Perhaps history, anthropology, sociology or literary 
theory may have an interest and instruments for studying conceptions of the world, 
but whoever insists on studying them in philosophy will be reminded: “Do not 
bother”. What can we say? 
 Here is a conjecture: perhaps we can understand this map about Latin American, 
or Mexican, philosophy from two perspectives. The first perspective is to understand 
it from a static epistemology. Therefore, with the positions of abstract universalism 
and cultural particularisms, we operate with static concepts that lead to an opposition 
that is no less popular than it is false. This condemns us to choose: either you work 
with abstractions and general problems, or you abandon philosophy and attend more 
or less concrete problems about “conceptions of the world”, or about the specific 
                                                
4 Salazar Bondy 2004. The well-known attacks of José Mariátegui can be located, among other critics, 
in an analogous direction to that of Salazar Bondy: “All the thinkers of our America have been 
educated in European schools. The spirit of the race is not felt in their work. The continent’s 
intellectual production lacks its own characteristics. It does not have an original profile”, in Mariátegui 
1996, 118. I take this opportunity to indicate that, for sure, I expressed myself poorly but, against 
Orosco, I do not understand my Pereda 2006 as defending an abstract universalism; in that paper I 
expressed myself as one more critical participant of Latin American philosophy concerned about some 
of its colonial vices. Therefore I am not completely far from the criticisms of Salazar Bondy or 
Mariátegui. It is a critical work within the framework of what I later identify as the strategy of the 
passages in the perspective of an epistemic nomadism. In any case, we must not forget the 
controversial context—in the interior of a tradition—in which criticisms such as these are introduced. 
5 Salazar Bondy’s criticisms or other analogous criticisms can be made both as part of an abstract 
universalism and as a culturalist particularism, or from other positions. 
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circumstances of certain social groups, or even of the experience of individuals. 
However, in the latter case it will be concluded —again, not without arrogance—that 
these worldviews are not the subject of philosophy. 
 However, it is also possible to understand that map according to a model that has 
more effects than is perhaps assumed: from the perspective of a nomadic 
epistemology.6 In this second perspective, the positions of abstract universalism and 
of cultural particularisms, and even of personal singularisms—those that concern the 
experiences and problems of a social group and even of an individual—will no longer 
form an opposition. On the contrary, these positions will become the extremes of a 
continuum of nomadic thought: frequent comings and goings of knowledge and 
inquiry; on the one hand between what happens in one place and what happens in 
another, on the other hand between the abstract and the concrete. What do I mean 
with that continuum? 
 For example, in this way, more or less particular difficulties and problems, or 
apparently particular or singular difficulties and problems, arising from concrete 
experiences with respect to body, gender, race, language or place of origin, can often 
also become starting points for the formulation of problems, or challenges of customs 
rooted in other traditions. Therefore, one can interrogate not only, predictably, an 
ethical or political theory, but also an epistemology and, from this starting point, a 
metaphysics about the place of body, gender, race, language or place of origin. 
Moreover, it may be desirable, at the same time, to generalize and refine the catalog 
of questions and examine which problems are taken into account and privileged, or 
left aside, in the various theories. Are epistemic problems the colonial vices and the 
resistances to such vices?7 Should territory and its good or bad organization, as well 
as the persistent concerns of human animals such as body, sexuality, desires, beliefs, 
emotions, violence and peace, also be concerns of metaphysics? Or is it better to think 
“being” or “what there is” or, if you prefer, “reality”—breathtaking words!—without 
the phenomenon of life; and therefore, without animals; and therefore, without the 
human animals that are born in certain places under certain conditions, and sooner or 
later die. One needs to be careful, however, with what is determined as valid 
problems: because what is excluded throws lights and shadows on what is included. 
  In turn, a nomadic thought also implies taking into account universal lessons that 
must operate as restrictions of particular or singular customs, perhaps even to reject 
them. In this way we must defend, among others, so-called “human rights”. For 
example, in Latin America this is about resisting the constant violations of the rights 
                                                
6 This epistemic nomadism tries to echo in theory a vital nomadism that occurs in practice both socially 
—large voluntary and involuntary migrations—and personally. Such nomadisms, in various forms—
some more terribly painful than others—are common in the experience of a large part of the population 
of Latin America, including many philosophers. In Reed-Sandoval 2016, Amy Reed-Sandoval 
discusses several distinctions regarding these social nomadisms ‘displaced’, immigrants, exiles, 
refugees...). For her discussion, Reed-Sandoval takes as a starting place my book Pereda 2018. 
7 For example, José Medina deals with unusual problems in the analytical epistemological tradition. In 
Medina 2012 he deals with problems that concern both the production of knowledge and ignorance. 
Among these problems is the epistemic exclusion and the silencing of racism, sexism and homophobia, 
as well as the marginalization to which those exclusions condemn people. 
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of women, of indigenous populations, of destitute people, or of what some consider to 
be “divergent sexualities”, against abuses that disguise themselves as “protective 
attitudes” or, perhaps with more hypocrisy, as “cultural traditions.” It is also about 
investigating how a condition as universal as the condition of truth places severe 
restrictions on the most diverse beliefs whether explicit or implicit in practices (and, 
for example, allows to distinguish “real” news from “fake news”). 
 Thus, there are two resources of great utility for a nomadic epistemology. These 
are strategies that are often intertwined; however, it is analytically convenient to 
distinguish them. The horizontal nomadism or strategy of detours allows us to attend 
to ramifications which are sometimes outlandish in appearance. Therefore, with this 
strategy, more or less collateral paths are taken into account not only to illuminate 
experiences and actions on the main roads, but also to broaden the debates: to enrich 
them with problems, descriptions, and histories that sometimes burst suddenly, 
unexpectedly. (For example, when discussing the moral, legal and political problems 
of violence, it is convenient to discuss the political presuppositions of violence, or, in 
an epistemology of belief, not only virtuous but also vicious uses should be 
considered.)  
 In its turn, vertical nomadism or strategy of passages serves to change the level of 
abstraction. Moving from more abstract levels to more concrete levels of inquiry, this 
procedure enables reciprocal illuminations. (For example, it may help us to address in 
what ways social corruption and violence configure phenomena in Mexico, so that, 
although local, give more material to think about repercussions that are not usually 
suspected. Or, when a nomadic epistemology is adopted, perhaps we may worry how 
biases and prejudices specifically distort beliefs, for example, in Mexico or in certain 
social groups in Mexico.) 
 In nineteenth-century Mexico, from the more or less tenuous liberalism to the 
radical liberalism of Ignacio Ramírez (1818–1879)8 and his intense concern for 
Indians, women and “day laborers” (as Ramírez called the workers), several examples 
of this nomadic thought can be found. In the case of Ramírez, he elaborated his 
vertical nomadism by articulating the more concrete naturalistic interests that he had 
taken from the European Enlightenment. However, I will only take a moment to 
review—really quickly—how the nomadic epistemology of one of the leading 
Mexican philosophers of the second half of the 20th century, Luis Villoro (1922–
2014),9 dissolves the false opposition that occupies us between abstract universalism 
and cultural particularism. 
                                                
8 Ramírez (1984–1989). It is worth emphasizing here Maciel 1984 and Monsiváis 1985. As an 
introduction to this era, Reyes Heroles 1957 is still a valuable source. 
9 In this brief rereading of Villoro, I return to ideas already expressed in several of my previous works, 
as in in Pereda 2017. On the other hand, in Pereda 1987 I discuss in some detail his Villoro 1998a. In 
another book of mine, Pereda 2013, I include four works on Villoro: “On Knowledge and Servitude in 
Luis Villoro” (“Del saber y de la servidumbre en Luis Villoro”), “Answers and Questions to Villoro” 
(“Respuestas y preguntas a Villoro”), “Villoro and Wisdom” (“Villoro y la sabiduría”) and “Villoro, 
Muguerza, and the Fight Against Arrogant Reason” (“Villoro, Muguerza y el combate a la razón 
arrogante”). 
197 
 
 
Comparative Philosophy 10.1 (2019)  PEREDA 
 Whoever skims through the numerous writings of Villoro will immediately 
perceive a constant use of the strategy of detours and the strategy of passages as tools 
for his research. His first books start from urgent concerns in those turbulent and 
hopeful years of the end of the first half of the 20th century: The Great Moments of 
Indigenism in Mexico (Los grandes momentos del indigenismo en México)10 and The 
Ideological Process of the Revolution of Independence (El proceso ideológico de la 
revoluación de Independencia).11 “Two problems much in the grips of ‘cultural 
particularism’ and not too promising to begin a philosophical career!”, it may be 
repeated again, not without arrogance. However, it is noticeworthy that the general 
theories of ideology and of revolutionary processes never left Villoro; but perhaps 
more important was the concern for the indigenous peoples of Mexico, as well as for 
the “impure” plurality of cultures.12 These were problems that haunted him 
throughout his life. Despite these deep concerns, however, Villoro never confused 
philosophy with the sentimental pamphlet or, what is worse, with those easy and 
strident divagations that in the mass media of Latin America often try to pass as 
philosophy. In this regard, it is worth not forgetting some of his uses of the strategy of 
detours. In Villoro 2009, Villoro seeks to recover the “process of reason that goes 
from unfounded judgment to evident judgment”,13 the epistemic process by which we 
abandon beliefs without support—among which ideological beliefs occupy a central 
place—to acquire those that possess it. In Villoro 2014 the author opposes ideological 
beliefs, whose function is to implant in society the current understandings backed by 
the incumbent power, to critical beliefs or, as he also calls them, “disruptive” beliefs. 
These and other uses of the detour strategy find a first culmination in his great book 
Belief, Personal and Propositional Knowledge, an original and meticulous 
epistemology, at least apparently in the most rigorous analytical tradition. I pointed 
out: “at least apparently” since as early as in the prologue Villoro asks unusual 
questions for the epistemology of this tradition (at least during the time he was 
writing the book). For example, he asks things like: “How does human reason work, 
through history, to reiterate situations of domination or, on the contrary, to free us 
from our restraints?”14 
 These and other uses of the strategy of detours led him to his books with a more 
directly moral and political content: Power and Value. Foundations for a Political 
Ethics (El Poder y el valor. Fundamentos de una ética política),15 Plural State, 
Plurality of Cultures (Estado plural, pluralidad de culturas),16 Challenges of Society 
to Come. Essays on Justice, Democracy and Multiculturalism (Los retos de la 
                                                
10 Villoro 1950. 
11 Villoro 1953. 
12 The concern for the “purity” of a culture, a tradition, an identity, a blood, perhaps even for an 
academic discipline, is anything but pure. Sooner or later it is often revealed as a sinister concern: a 
tool to pursue and annihilate the other. 
13 Villoro 2009, 13. 
14 Villoro 1998a, 9. 
15 Villoro 1997. 
16 Villoro 1998b. 
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sociedad por venir. Ensayos sobre justicia, democracia y multiculturalismo)17 and his 
posthumous book The Alternative: Perspectives and Possibilities for Change (La 
alternativa: perspectivas y posibilidades de cambio).18 In these last works, Villoro 
returns to the strategy of passages and his concern to analyze concrete problems. He 
had used this strategy abundantly in his first two books and never stopped using it in 
his relentless journalistic work.19 (In his journal articles Villoro usually illuminates a 
problem, for example, social inequalities in Mexico, with abstract and general 
reflections; at the same time, he tries to exemplify those abstract and general 
reflections with details from the particular situations he discusses.) Along with the 
different political situations in Latin America that Villoro never stopped paying 
attention to and often suffered, Villoro was especially impacted by the 1994 Zapatista 
Army of National Liberation uprising. I cannot forget the scandal that sometimes was 
caused by seeing the image of an old Villoro—one of the patriarchs of Mexican 
culture—in Zapatista videos, sitting next to Subcomandante Marcos and other 
members of the National Liberation Army discussing liberalism and 
communitarianism, without refusing to question even prestigious arguments and 
theories, for example, of Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls.20 Against those thinkers 
Villoro insisted: it is urgent to attend to concrete injustices before, or at least together 
with, a positive and abstract theory of justice. According to Villoro, it is not possible 
to think about justice without building, at the same time, a theory of particular 
injustices: of the diverse experiences of exclusion and violence (exclusion and 
violence for being an indigenous person, for being a woman, for being poor, for being 
a refugee, for being a disabled person...).21 Only after using the strategy of passages, 
                                                
17 Villoro 2007. 
18 Villoro 2015. In this book, Villoro discusses the Zapatista’s proposals and includes correspondence 
between him and Subcomandante Marcos. 
19 Cfr. Hurtado 2017, 267–286. I slightly disagree with Hurtado: we do not find in Villoro a 
“conversion”, but a radicalization of old positions. On the other hand, it is again worth remembering 
the Mexican liberals of the 19th century and not only their constant journalistic writing, but also their 
launching newspapers and magazines. Since then, this activity has been a frequent tradition among 
philosophers and, in general, among intellectuals in Latin America, at least until the beginning of the 
21st century. The concern that guided and still guides them was and is clear: to reinvigorate and 
influence with their interventions the public sphere. 
20 Radio Zapatista, http://radiozapatista.org./. 
21 In this regard, it would be of the utmost importance to discuss step by step the meticulous and acute 
paper Pappas 2017. In what follows I only sketch a few preliminary notes. Pappas observes: “The 
Latin American approach shared by decolonialists and Villoro can be contrasted with an atomistic 
approach to the problem of injustice. The atomistic approach is one that stresses the particularity of an 
injustice by neglecting history, and in general the relation of that event with other or with structural 
causes” (Pappas 2017, 5). Expressed in a different way, this quotaton may be read as suggesting that 
the atomistic approach ignores a nomadic epistemology and its strategies of passages and detours. As 
to the strategy of passages, Pappas emphasizes the need to start from the passages that articulate the 
most concrete experiences. In this sense, Pappas cites Villoro’s second letter to Subcomandante 
Marcos: “Our starting point should be our particular experiences of marginalization and injustices” 
(Villoro 2015, 105). To this point of departure, Pappas opposes that of decolonialists and their 
tendency to take as their starting points general theories of the world-system and dependency. Thus, 
Pappas observes: “the quest for a comprehensive explanation and a grand historical narrative is also in 
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of the passages from the abstract to the concrete, it becomes possible to carry out a 
detailed account of the constant and almost universal faults of the recognition of the 
other.22 But, what can we do so we don’t lose sight of such strategies? 
 In one of our last conversations, worrying about the dangers of converting the 
exchange of arguments—so characteristic of philosophy—into a parlor game or some 
kind of “vice”—a sort of “rationalizing” which sometimes becomes an endless 
rumination going nowhere, Villoro said: “Sometimes you have to think and reason, 
but other times you have to look and listen.”23 I cannot think of a briefer way to 
summarize a principle of what I understand by nomadic epistemology and, in general, 
of nomadic thought: going from thinking and reasoning to looking and listening and 
vice versa, over and over again.  
  However, it is now time to pay attention to the sense in which nomadic thought is 
a “resource” for. 
 
2. 
 
Perhaps a small exercise in ordinary language philosophy with the English word 
“resource” and the Spanish word “recurso”—its usual translation—may help us to 
                                                                                                                                      
danger of not capturing the historical and concrete particularity (pluralism, complexity, uniqueness) of 
actual injustices. When we start at the broad level of globality and history as decolonialists often do, 
there is a risk of oversimplifying and encouraging blindness about concrete injustices” (Pappas 2017, 
8). To be sure, Pappas is right: to remain only in such a comprehensive point of view makes us blind to 
the particulars. Those extremely general “philosophies of history”—we have to call them some way—
that seem to explain everything, not only do not genuinely explain anything but, what matters most, are 
little or not useful at all for concrete action: for the public policies they intend to guide. However, with 
his reasoning, does not Pappas seem to succumb to a version of the first false opposition we discussed, 
the one between abstract universalism and cultural particularisms? Perhaps many decolonialists could 
attack Pappas, on the one hand, by observing that introducing into the discussion that arrogant form of 
reason that is colonialist reason has a certain explanatory power. On the other hand, surely it will be 
indicated that concentrating too much on the particular experiences makes us return to the atomistic 
approach that Pappas himself began by criticizing. The solution is not, therefore, a static epistemology, 
and a dilemma between attention to specific experiences and circumstances and general or even 
universal theories, but to use from the standpoint of a nomadic epistemology the strategy of passages 
to go from one to the other and vice versa: to dissolve that false opposition, and to study the reciprocal 
determinations between the particular and the general in an endless sway. 
22 Cf., Villoro 2007, 15. 
23 On Villoro’s emphasis on listening, I remember words from Ángeles Eraña: “from my perspective, 
the most important inheritance that [Villoro] leaves us has to do with his role as a student of the 
Zapatista school. A teacher who is a student. [But] to be a student you have to know how to listen (or 
learn to do it), and humility is required for this. We need to recognize that there are other ways, that 
light can come from other sides, that we know little, that we understand less.” (See Eraña 2017, 287–
288). In this way, we can conclude that Villoro’s nomadic epistemology is a consequence of his vital, 
personal nomadism: the events of history teach this great master to resist and to lose old desires and 
beliefs in order to start over again as an attentive apprentice who knows how to listen. In a beautiful 
memory of his father, writer Juan Villoro tells us something similar: “the scholar of Sahagun, Las 
Casas, Clavijero and Vasco de Quiroga became interlocutor of the indigenous communities, not with 
the desire to advise or illustrate, but to learn from them” (Villoro 2017, 334). 
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immediately dissolve the second false opposition—or what might be considered, 
rather than a false opposition, just a difference of emphasis.  
 In English, a common use of the word “resource” refers to 
 
1. Means for something, and/or 
2. An ability to deal with a situation effectively. 
 
 The second sense can be understood as a precision of the first: the ability to know 
how to use those means effectively. A third common use refers to 
 
3. An available supply, an available capital. 
 
In this sense, “resourceful” refers to a rich country, or a rich tradition, or a rich 
person, because it is a country, a tradition, or a person with many resources or tools to 
acquire resources.  
 Regarding the Spanish word “recurso” we also find the uses already noted in 
relation to the English word “resource”, but there’s something more. The word 
“recurso” is also used as 
 
 4. A claim against something. 
 
 This last sense can be found in judicial practice: a “recurso de apelación” refers to 
an appeal procedure. 
 However, why should we focus on words like “resources”, “recursos”? For 
example, Manuel Vargas has proposed to think of the value of philosophy in general 
and, therefore, of Latin American philosophy and, thus, also of Mexican philosophy, 
as a “cultural resource”.24 I’d like to concentrate for a moment on these ideas, and 
then I will try to reconstruct the observations of Robert Elí Sánchez, Jr.,25 not so 
much as objections to Vargas’s argument, but as a nomadic remark: as developments 
and complements. 
 Vargas starts from the truth of the following statements: 
 
• There are cultural differences. 
• Cultural differences can have consequences.26 
 
 Among those consequences, there is the fact that each culture has different 
resources (sense 3). Vargas characterizes a cultural resource as: 
 
any entity, practice, pattern of judgment, or collection whose nature and origin depends at 
least in part of the shared norms of a community of intentional agents.27 
                                                
24 Vargas 2010, 33–52. 
25 Sánchez 2014.  
26 Vargas 2010, 34. 
27 Vargas 2010, 37. 
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 He adds that these cultural resources are means to achieve certain ends effectively 
(senses 1 and 2 of “resources”); namely: 
 
[cultural resources] tend to have cultural utility. Cultural utility is anything that assists in 
the flourishing, survival or perpetuation of a given culture, understood in a very broad 
way.28 
 
 As examples of practices bearing this cultural utility, Vargas points out the 
humanities and, among them, philosophy: 
 
The humanities, those oft-unappreciated disciplines in the university system, are deeply 
involved in the production and preservation of complex cultural resources. The discipline 
of philosophy is a species of this more general project of producing and preserving 
complex cultural resources. Philosophy shares with other disciplines the general task of 
discovering, constructing, and preserving complex ideas with a wide degree of cultural 
utility.29 
 
 As already suggested by the title of his paper—“On the Value of Philosophy: The 
Latin American Case”, good Latin American philosophy does have value, as any 
good philosophy. Let me add: adopting an epistemic nomadism and its strategies of 
detours and passages is a good way to do good philosophy anywhere, a good way of 
discovering and building complex ideas beyond the usual problems and arguments. 
Both strategies are also a good means for the preservation of those ideas. 
 Suppose—an assumption that Vargas does not have to hold—that “resources of 
cultural utility” are exclusively understood as what we can call “affirmative values” 
or resources that are added to the established theories: resources added to the 
arguments or existing methodologies, but without criticizing or questioning them. 
Thus, “resources of cultural utility” would be reduced to introduce additions in a 
repertoire that is part, for example, of a static epistemology, in which there is no 
epistemic nomadism. We know in advance what types of questions to ask and the 
types of answers required, so it is forbidden to formulate other types of questions and 
answers. Consequently, not only the fourth use of the Spanish word “recurso” (“a 
claim against something”) would be forgotten but, even more importantly, a task that 
has been and is constitutive of philosophy is being suppressed, namely, critical 
thinking, both singular and focal (related to a specific topic), and general (as a 
challenge to a whole way of understanding philosophy, society and life).  
 Precisely these omissions and suppressions—these suicidal omissions and 
suppressions for any genuine philosophy—are what Robert Elí Sánchez, Jr., fears are 
performed when the value of philosophy is introduced with the notion of “cultural 
resources”. Thus, Sánchez points out that this is a way in which the emphatically 
critical, negative value that philosophy must have is neglected: 
                                                
28 Vargas 2010, 38. 
29 Vargas 2010, 41. 
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the value of radically destroying pretenses, traditions, and cultural norms and of injecting 
a sense of uncanniness, not-knowing, and solitude into our lives.30 
 
  In this regard, Sánchez insists on understanding philosophy also as a nomadic 
thought that, from time to time, becomes extreme and branched, and is formulated as 
a general challenge, “philosophy as a disruption of an entire culture”:31 
 
What is potentially valuable is not only what distinguishes it (Latin American 
philosophy), but a challenge to the kind of question we ask about it or the kind of answer 
that satisfies us.32 
 
 In this way, Sánchez takes into account and underlines the importance of the 
strategy of detours in philosophical work: “this awareness raises [...] particular 
questions inside philosophy about the value of diversity”.33 But not only that.  With 
this awareness, Sánchez does not neglect the strategy of passages in as much as he 
introduces “critically important questions about whether the nature of philosophy is 
determined in part by who participates, and how we should respond if it is.”34 
It is not by chance, then, that from these ideas, Sánchez partially reaches conclusions 
against Vargas by pointing out that: 
 
Philosophy does produce, preserve, and propagate complex cultural resources —
certainly. But it can also disrupt and destabilize our grip on the manifestation of a 
tradition or way of life.35 
 
 In this passage, the two decisive words are “disrupt” and “destabilize”. In this 
sense, Sánchez is right not neglecting the negative, critical, therapeutic value of 
philosophy or, in general, of culture; but he has little reason to consider that this value 
cannot also be subsumed under the expression “cultural resources” or, more 
explicitly, under “resources of cultural utility”. We must not forget the 
comprehensive and extremely friendly sense with which Vargas introduces the 
concept of cultural utility: “anything that assists in the flourishing, survival or 
perpetuation of a given culture, understood in very broad ways”. Due to their defiant 
attitude and therapeutic tendencies, other frequently anomalous philosophers, like 
Socrates, Kierkegaard or Wittgenstein—or Villoro in Mexico or, in the rest of Latin 
America, José Martí or Carlos Vaz Ferreira, offered essential resources for the 
“flourishing, survival or perpetuation”, not only of philosophical culture, but of their 
societies. Hence, the singular and general criticisms, as well as the challenges and 
therapies, are also essential “cultural resources”. 
                                                
30 Sánchez 2014, 5. 
31 Sánchez 2014, 4. 
32 Sánchez 2014, 6. 
33 Sánchez 2014, 7. 
34 Sánchez 2014, 7. 
35 Sánchez 2014, 7. 
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If, next to the first false opposition—the particular versus the universal—and to the 
second quasi-false opposition—the positive versus the negative values of cultural 
resources—I propose that there is a genuine opposition, we might ask now, rather 
impatiently, what kind of philosophy can be opposed to thinking it as “cultural 
resources” of a nomadic epistemology that includes valuable fragments of Latin 
American philosophy and, therefore, also of Mexican philosophy?  
 
3. 
 
I have explicitly alluded at least twice in this paper to an arrogant attitude. (But of 
course one can suspect that arrogance also lurks, latently, or manifestly, on other 
occasions). For example, from a static epistemology Mexican philosophy has been 
arrogantly cornered to make a choice in the false opposition between abstract 
universalism and culturalist particularism. Arrogance was also assumed by those who 
consider it unpromising to begin a philosophical career using the strategy of passages 
in studies as particular as the indigenism in Mexico and the ideology of Mexican 
independence wars.36 However, both attitudes are, if I am not mistaken, only 
indications of a relatively common way of wrongly engaging philosophy and, more 
comprehensively, culture and life. For that reason, I denounce what I call an “arrogant 
reason” as a basic way of orienting ourselves or, more precisely, of disorienting 
ourselves, not only in philosophy but also in problems in general.37 I’ll take now a 
moment to examine what would be maxims on which this reason is put into practice. 
  For example, one or several agents might fall prey to arrogant reasoning when 
they refuse to investigate unusual problems with the strategy of detours—for 
example, the authority of a philosophical canon, or when one refuses to ponder 
arguments about racism and homophobia, or with the strategy of passages, going 
from the particular—from concrete situations and even individual oppression—to the 
general—a radical change of political regime—and vice versa.38 Instead of using 
these strategies, one only seeks to display an affiliation. These affiliations may be, for 
example, to a powerful social heritage, a strong economic group, or even to a style of 
                                                
36 Another example of the use of the strategy of passages are the following statements by Leopoldo 
Zea: “The point of departure of those who think is always the concrete man.... This is the golden rule 
of philosophy: to start from our own, concrete problems, and then to look for the universal that may be 
within in it.... I mean: in my identity I run into other similar identities, I find that there are other human 
beings who have problems like me: problems like those that all humans have at all times”. See Pereda 
2013, 98–99. 
37 In Villoro 2007 the author opposes arrogant reason to the reasonable: “Reasonable, in fact, are 
beliefs and norms that do not express an ‘arrogant reason’ (Carlos Pereda) but a reasonable exercise of 
justice; reasonable is also a political theory that leads to an effective democracy”. Villoro 2007, 11.  
38 The writer Alfonso Reyes (1889—1959), had already warned, some time before the philosophers 
that Orosco includes as “culturalists”—several members of the Hyperion group—that “the only way to 
be profitably national is to be generously universal”. See Reyes 1952. According to the strategy of 
passages, it is also worth considering, for example, with Zea, the inverse warning: the only way to be 
profitably universal is to be generously national, and, perhaps, even generously personal. (Cfr. Hurtado 
2015.) On the importance of this group, see also Stehn 2018. 
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thought that prevails at the moment. Of course, reducing one’s identity to a 
“prestigious affiliation” not only demarcates it—it also makes us forget our 
deficiencies and protects us through delusions. This first maxim of arrogant reason 
commands, then: In front of any problem or conflict, exhibit your prestigious 
affiliation. 
 In turn, this affiliation receives, as part of its support and, sometimes, as its only 
support, the emphatic disdain or contempt and, at times, the militant rejection that 
those agents or that social group directs against those who oppose or are indifferent to 
it. For example, anyone who proposes a course in Mexican philosophy explicitly or 
implicitly will be prescribed the already stated phrase “don’t bother”. This second 
maxim of arrogant reason commands: To justify yourself, in addition to exhibiting an 
affiliation, show and, if possible, express your disdain or contempt towards 
everything that is not subsumed under that affiliation. 
 On the other hand, arrogant uses of reason tend to immunize our presuppositions. 
The agent or agents firmly reject in advance any critical, focal or general questions, 
especially when the latter questions become comprehensive challenges that perhaps 
put into question the affiliation that is boasted. Thus, a third maxim of arrogant reason 
commands: In front of difficulties with your affiliate identity, shield yourself. 
  I said that, along with the two false oppositions, there was a genuine opposition I 
wanted to introduce. The opposition that I want to defend is this: against the operation 
of arrogant reason, I want to introduce another principle of nomadic thought: act with 
a porous reason. For example, time and again the agent or agents come and go 
between numerous affiliations and points of view. These affiliations imply links and 
perspectives relating not only to the past and the present, but also to the practices to 
be carried out in the future. With considerations like these, I formulate a first maxim 
of porous reason: When facing doubts, ambiguities, conflicts, act assuming numerous 
affiliations and points of view. 
 However, we must not forget that common vice,—“rationalizing”—and its 
disintegrating extreme —endless rumination. This addiction, coupled with the fear 
often caused by the risks involved in looking and listening to what we are not used to, 
and in supporting and understanding other desires, other beliefs, and other life 
proposals, often causes us to react by humiliating others. Therefore, I would like to 
formulate as follows a second maxim of porous reason: Act from real or imaginary 
conversations in which you interact not only as someone who thinks and reasons, but 
also as someone who looks and listens, without neglecting the possibility of 
introducing scientific arguments in such conversations. 
 Let us suppose now that, based on these maxims, we get to strengthen habits that 
sometimes imply questioning our most cherished schemes for appreciation with the 
purpose of detoxifying ourselves from our own affiliations. This leads us to a third 
maxim of porous reason: Let yourself be challenged. 
 I conclude then taking up the question “Why courses on Mexican philosophy?” 
Or, more comprehensively: “Why courses on Latin American philosophy?” The 
halfway response I have proposed implies expanding the tradition, enriching it. 
However, why should these other sometimes idiosyncratic and unique voices be of 
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interest? Philosophy has always been, and is, on the brink of suicide when it does not 
consider the changing plurality of voices, not only in continuity, but also in 
opposition. We rarely know in advance where these criticisms, these challenges will 
come from. This is another way to say: philosophy or, at least, good philosophy, has 
never feared of working from nomadic thought and, therefore, with porous reason.  
 Of course, each one of these statements can be questioned, and can be subjected 
to new criticisms and challenges. However, taking these questions and challenges into 
account would lead us to longer, perhaps much longer, elaborations than those we can 
provide here. 
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